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RESPONDING TO TERRORISM: HOW MUST A





Terrorism has become commonplace in the world today.1 In the
past decade, the United States was, for the first time, the victim of
terrorist attacks on its own soil.2 Conversely, the State of Israel has
been engaged in a perpetual struggle with terrorism since the day
of its founding in 1948.3 As democracies, the United States and
Israel4 are subject to a great deal of criticism with respect to legisla-
tion used to combat terrorism. Responding to terrorism, a ques-
tion often arises regarding the measures that a democratic state
may legally apply in order to effectively protect its citizens and yet
* J.D. candidate, Fordham University School of Law, 2004; B.S. in Business Ad-
ministration, Finance, University of Florida Honors Program, 2001. I would like to
thank Professor Abraham Abramovsky whose Law and Terrorism seminar inspired
this Comment. I would also like to thank the editors and staff of the Fordham Urban
Law Journal for their time and dedication.
1. See John Ward Anderson, Attack on Farm Kills At Least Five Israelis; Police
Thwart Suicide Bombers in Same Area, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2002, at A16; Anemona
Hartocollis, Deepening Shadows, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, at 14.
2. See STEVEN EMERSON, AMERICAN JIHAD: THE TERRORISTS LIVING AMONG
Us (2002); ARNO FROESE, TERROR OVER AMERICA: UNDERSTANDING THE TRAG-
EDY 33-34 (2001); Michael C. Bonafede, Here, There, and Everywhere: Assessing the
Proportionality Doctrine and U.S. Uses of Force in Response to Terrorism After the
September 11 Attacks, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 155,184 (2002) (citing Malcolm Gladwell,
At Least 5 Die, 500 Hurt as Explosion Rips Garage Under World Trade Center, WASH.
POST, Feb. 27, 1993, at Al); Malcolm Gladwell, Sheik, 9 Others Convicted in N.Y
Bomb, WASH. POST, Oct. 2, 1995, at Al.
3. E.g., CHAIM HERZOG, THE ARAB-ISRAELI WARS: WAR AND PEACE IN THE
MIDDLE EAST FROM THE WAR OF INDEPENDENCE TO LEBANON 7 (1985).
4. The Israeli declaration of independence unequivocally created a democracy:
The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingather-
ing of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit
of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envis-
aged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and
political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will
guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture;
it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the
principles of the Charter of the United Nations.
THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHED STATE OF ISRAEL (May 14, 1948).
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continue to honor human rights.' The ability of a democratic state
to efficiently defend itself from terror is a difficult task and ulti-
mately reflects the moral integrity of the state.6 Maintaining the
balance between public safety and human rights is presumably
harder today, considering recent suicide bombings.7 For the
United States, protecting against terrorism is especially challeng-
ing, considering it has seldom been seen throughout American his-
tory.' Nonetheless, the United States government has taken
numerous steps in response to the new issues it faces arising from
the September 11th attacks on New York and Washington, D.C.9
This Comment compares the Israeli and American laws that
sanction controversial responses to terrorism. It discusses criti-
cisms of these laws with respect to human rights violations and
how, if at all, the two governments strive to preserve their law's
effectiveness without violating international standards. Part I of
this comment briefly discusses the origins of terrorism and estab-
lishes a universal definition for the word. Part II reviews the his-
tory of three Israeli responses to terrorism, including 1)
administrative detention, 2) torture, and 3) the demolition of
houses; and describes how these tactics are criticized domestically
as well as internationally. Part II further illustrates the present sta-
tus of relevant Israeli statutory and case law. Finally, Part III dis-
cusses comparable measures recently taken by the United States1 °
and how these responses are criticized. The importance of a de-
mocracy's need to "respond appropriately" to terrorism and the
difficulty that flows with it will be stressed throughout this
comment.
5. Emanuel Gross, Democracy's Struggle Against Terrorism: The Powers of Mili-
tary Commanders to Decide Upon the Demolition of Houses, the Imposition of Cur-
fews, Blockades, Encirclements and the Declaration of an Area as a Closed Military
Area, 30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 165, 179 (2002) [hereinafter Gross, Democracy's
Struggle].
6. Gross, Democracy's Struggle, supra note 5, at 168.
7. Id. See generally Margot Dudkevitch, Dolphinarium Attack Planner Nabbed,
JERUSALEM POST, Nov. 21, 2002, at 2 (discussing the increasing frequency of suicide
bombings).
8. See Gross, Democracy's Struggle, supra note 5, at 166 (noting that Israel is
"currently facing a war the like of which few states have known in the past"). The
Japanese kamikazes operating during World War II are perhaps the best-known ex-
ample of suicide bombers. These actions, however, were committed by soldiers facing
the soldiers of their enemy and hence were different from the modern day suicide
bombers. Id.
9. See infra Part III.
10. Specifically, detention, the freezing or blocking of assets, and torture.
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I. THE ORIGIN AND DEFINITION OF TERRORISM
The word "terrorism" originated during the French Revolution,
when the French government instituted the "Reign of Terror" to
execute political opponents, seize their property, and force the rest
of the population into submission."' Today, the word terrorism has
taken on a new meaning. Scholars agree that terror cannot be
clearly defined. 12 England, however, attempted to define "terror-
ism" in part 20 of the British Prevention of Terrorism ("Temporary
Provisions") Act of 1989.13 According to the Act, "terrorism
means the use of violence for political ends and includes any use of
violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the
public in fear."14
The Fourth Geneva Convention, adopted in 1949, similarly pro-
vides that an act of violence against the population, against civil-
ians who are not combatants, for political, ethnic, racial or religious
reasons, will be regarded as a terrorist act.' 5
Even with the numerous meanings given to the word terrorism, a
majority of the definitions possess a common basis: terrorism is the
use of violence against civilians or non-military targets in order to
achieve a particular purpose. 6
H. ISRAELI RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
A. Administrative Detention
The literal definition of administrative detention is detention
carried out by an administrative power and not by a judicial power
or authority. 7 This definition, however, does not make clear the
11. David B. Kopel & Joseph Olson, Preventing a Reign of Terror: Civil Liberties
Implications of Terrorism Legislation, 21 OKLA. CITY U.L. REV. 247, 251 n.11 (1996)
(A terrorist was initially defined during the French Revolution as: "an adherent or
supporter of the Jacobins, who advocated and practised methods of partisan repres-
sion and bloodshed in the propagation of the principles of democracy and equality."
(quoting THE NEW SHORTER OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3258 (1993))).
12. See Emanuel Gross, Terrorism and the Law: Democracy in the War Against
Terrorism-the Israeli Experience, 35 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1161, 1164 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Gross, Terrorism and the Law].
13. British Prevention of Terrorism Act (Temporary Provisions), 1989, pt. 20.
14. Id.
15. The Geneva Convention (IV), Aug. 12, 1949, Part III, sec. 1.
16. See Gross, Terrorism and the Law, supra note 12, at 1164.
17. Emanuel Gross, Human Rights, Terrorism and the Problem of Administrative
Detention in Israel: Does a Democracy Have the Right to Hold Terrorists as Bargaining
Chips?, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 721, 752 (2001) [hereinafter Gross, Human
Rights] ("[D]etention is considered adminstrative detention if ... it has been ordered
by the executive alone and the power of decision rests solely with the adminstrative
authority.").
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substance and nature of administrative detention.18 Administrative
detention, often referred to as preventative detention, is commonly
understood as imprisonment without trial.19 For purposes of this
comment, administrative detention is treated as the latter.
1. International Law on Administrative Detention
Over the past year and a half, the number of Palestinian de-
tainee residents of the occupied territories20 has reportedly in-
creased from 12 to 929-an increase of almost 8,000 percent.21 In a
1999 public report discussing administrative detention, Amnesty
International acknowledged that Israel, as a High Contracting
Party to the Fourth Geneva Convention, 22 has been in violation of
the Convention for more than thirty years.23 Specifically, Israel is
in violation of Article 147 of the Geneva Convention, which labels
the "willful[ I depriv[ation] of the rights of [a] fair and regular
trial" a grave breach of the Convention.24 To critics, this infringe-
ment represents just one of many instances in which Israel has
18. See B'Tselem: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, Israeli Law, at http://www.btselem.org/english/AdministrativeDetention/
Israel Law.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2002) [hereinafter Israeli Law].
19. Id.
20. The occupied territories are West Bank and Gaza Strip. United Nations Of-
fice of the Special Coordinatorin the Occupied Territories, at http://
www.arts.mcgill.coz/mepp/ unsco/unfront.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
21. B'Tselem: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Terri-
tories, Administrative Detention Statistics, at http://www.btselem.orglenglish/Adminis-
trative Detention/Statistics.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2003).
22. A High Contracting Party is the terminology used to refer to a party to an
international convention.
23. Amnesty Int. On-line, Israel: Fourth Geneva Convention Meeting: An Abdica-
tion of Responsibility, at http://web.amnesty.org/ai.nsf/Index/MDE150471999 (July 15,
1999) [hereinafter An Abdication of Responsibility].
24. Geneva Convention (IV), Aug. 12, 1949, Part III, sec. 1, art. 147. Article 147
states in full:
Grave breaches to which the preceding Article relates shall be those involv-
ing any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property pro-
tected by the present Convention: wilful killing, torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering
or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or un-
lawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to
serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or wilfully depriving a protected per-
son of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Conven-
tion, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and
wantonly.
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failed to demonstrate a serious commitment to ensure compliance
with international humanitarian law.25
2. History of Israeli Law
a. Upon The Declaration of Independence
Israel (Palestine) was under the control of the British Mandate 26
until May 1948, when it declared its independence.2 1 Contempora-
neously with it's Declaration of Independence, Israel adopted the
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which the British
Mandatory Regime had introduced.28 Regulations 108 and 111
empowered the High Commissioner and Military Commander to
order the detention of a person if either official believed it neces-
sary for maintaining public order or securing public safety or state
security.29
b. Reform Achieved in 1979
Finally, in 1979, after repeated efforts,30 the detention laws of
Israel were reformed and a new Israeli statute was enacted-the
25. See An Abdication of Responsibility, supra note 23. ("Israel has reportedly
stated that it would not attend the re-affirmation meeting taking place on 12/5/
2001."); see also Amnesty Int. On-line, Israel: Respect of Fourth Geneva Convention
must be ensured by High Contracting Parties meeting in Geneva, at http://web.amnesty.
org/ai.nsf/Index/MDE15108200 (last visited Dec. 4, 2003) (discussing Israel's claim
that the Geneva Convention and the UN Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment do not apply to the Occu-
pied Territories).
26. After WWI a mandate system was established by article 22 of the Covenant of
the League of Nations as formulated at the Paris Peace Conference over the first half
of 1919. Palestine Facts: World War I British Mandate, at http://www.palestinefacts.
org/pf wwl-british-mandate.php (last visited Dec. 2, 2003). Under this article it was
stated that the territories inhabited by peoples unable to stand by themselves would
be entrusted to advanced nations until such time as the local population could handle
their own affairs. Id. In the case of Palestine, which at the time consisted of what is
today known as Israel and Jordan, the administrative control, in the form of a Man-
date, was given to the British. Id.
27. HENRY E. BAKER, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF ISRAEL 7-12 (1961).
28. Shimon Shetreet, A Contemporary Model of Emergency Detention Law: An
Assessment of the Israeli Law, 14 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTs. 182 (1984).
29. Harold Rudolph, The Judicial Review of Administrative Detention Orders in
Israel, 14 ISR. YEARBOOK ON HUM. RTS. 148, 152, 173 (1984). Prior to Israel's inde-
pendence, these laws were used by the British Mandate primarily against members of
Jewish underground organizations. Id. at 149. Accordingly, many criticized Israeli
adoption of the laws and pressured its government to reform the laws. Shetreet,
supra note 28, at 185.
30. The first major attempt to amend the law was in 1951 when the administrative
detention of a group of anti-Zionist, ultra-Orthodox Jews, called the "Religious Un-
derground," made the headlines. Gross, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 755.
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Emergency Powers (Detention) Law of 1979 ("Administrative De-
tention Law"). 31 The new law gave more rights to detainees than
did the pre-existing regulations.32 The following provisions of the
Administrative Detention Law comprise the significant modifica-
tions of the previous law:
1) If authorities do not bring the detainee before the President
of the District Court within forty-eight hours from the start of
detention, the detainee must be released unless some other
ground for detaining him exists.
2) The detainee must be present in court during the hearing of
his case.
3) A detainee has the right to be present in court at the time of
confirmation of the detention order and in the legal proceedings
thereafter, unless the judge believes that State security requires
otherwise.
4) The orders of the Minister of Defense are limited in time;
they are valid for six months only, however, the Minister may
extend the order for additional periods of six months.
5) The Chief of the General Staff has subsidiary power. If the
Chief of the General Staff has reasonable cause to believe that
conditions exist permitting the Minister of Defense to make an
order, the Chief of the General Staff, and only he, may issue a
detention order not exceeding forty-eight hours. He has
no power to extend the forty-eight-hour period and these pow-
ers cannot be delegated.33
The Administrative Detention Law also adds a further level of
judicial scrutiny.34 Detention must be judicially reviewed three
months after the district court confirms the order; thereafter, the
President of the district court must re-examine the decision to de-
tain every three months.
Furthermore, the detention order must be the sole available
means of achieving the desired result, and if means other than a
31. Emergency Powers (Detention) Law, 1979, S.H. 76. Initially, the new laws
only applied to Israel. In 1980, however, they were further applied to the Occupied
Territories. Following the violent uprising in 1987, known as the Intifada, Military
Order 1229 was given and made similar but more harsh guidelines with respect to
administrative detention in the Occupied Territories. Administrative Detention: The
Practice of Imprisonment Without Trial or Continuing Imprisonment After the Com-
pletion of Sentence, at http://www.geocities.com/onemans mind/jc/HRWO1.html (last
visited Dec. 2, 2002).
32. Compare Administrative Detention Law, 1979, S.H. 76, with Defence (Emer-
gency) Regulations, 1945, K.T. 108, 111.
33. Gross, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 756-57.
34. Id.
35. Administrative Detention Law, 1979 S.H. 76, § 5.
266
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detention order are available, the judge must declare the order
invalid.36
The Administrative Detention Law only applies once the Knes-
set 37 has declared a state of emergency. 38 This, however, has virtu-
ally no substantive implications, since Israel has been in a declared
state of emergency since its establishment.39
c. Further Developments in the Administrative Detention Law
Human Rights organizations continued to criticize Israeli poli-
cies on administrative detention despite the new procedural rights
afforded to detainees through the Administrative Detention Law.4°
On April 20, 2000, the Supreme Court of Israel called for the "fur-
ther hearing"41 of Anon v. Minister of Defence to deal with this
issue.42
36. Rudolph, supra note 29, at 157.
37. Asher Maoz, The Institutional Organization of the Israeli Legal System, in IN-
TRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF ISRAEL 11, 15 (Amos Shapira & Keren C. DeWitt-Arar
eds., 1995). Subsequent to its independence, in 1948, Israel created temporary central
institutions of government. Id. Shortly thereafter, a constituent assembly was
elected. In its first legislative act (the Transition Law, 1949) the constituent officially
established itself as the "legislative body" of the state of Israel and it adopted "Knes-
set" as its name. Id. Knesset is the Hebrew term for Assembly.
38. Israeli Law, supra note 18.
39. Id. As a result of the war the Arab countries waged against Israel, the govern-
ment of Israel declared a state of emergency immediately after the declaration of the
State of Israel in 1948. Id. That initial declaration of a state of emergency remained
in effect for many years without being reviewed by the legislature. Id. In 1992, Israel
adopted a different way of declaring the persistence of the state of emergency. In
accordance with Section 49 of Basic Law: the Government, the Knesset, may declare
a state of emergency for a period of up to one year, which period may be extended
from time to time. Gross, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 792 n.18.
40. See Amnesty Int. On-line, Israel/Occupied Territories: Administrative Deten-
tion: Despair, Uncertainty and Lack of Due Process, at http://web.amnesty.org/librar
y/index/ENGMDE150031997 (last visited Apr. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Administrative
Detention: Despair, Uncertainty and Lack of Due Process].
41. A "further hearing" is a special procedure by which the Supreme Court con-
siders a difficult issue it has previously decided. Gross, Human Rights, supra note 17,
at 721.
42. Id. (citing Further Hearing [F.H.] 7048/97, Anon v. Minister of Defence, 54(1)
P.D. 721, 743 (Isr. 2000)). The petition to the court came from several Lebanese
citizens who were detained after they had completed their prison sentences. In accor-
dance with the Administrative Detention Law, the Israeli government extended the
period of detention of the prisoners on several occasions. Id.
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Although the question before the bench in Anon was a narrow
one with respect to the Administrative Detention Law,43 the court
ruled on the general provisions of the law as well.44
In relevant part, Section 2(a) of the Administrative Detention
Law provides:
Where the Minister of Defence has reasonable cause to believe
that reasons of State security or public security require that a
particular person be detained, he may be order under his hand,
direct that such person be detained for a period, not exceeding
six months, stated in the order.45
In Anon, Chief Justice Barak held that the term "reasons of state
security," used in Section 2 "was sufficiently broad to embrace
events where the danger to the security of the state or public did
not ensue from the particular person himself. ' 46 He stated that he
was not content with a "linguistic" interpretation of "reasons of
state security" and that the law had to be interpreted accordingly. 47
Barak definitively held that a democratic society may hold a per-
son in administrative detention only if such person poses a "direct
threat and real danger to the State. ' 48 "In other words, if the de-
43. The Lebanese petitioners were being held by the Israeli government in efforts
to strike a bargain with the Lebanese government regarding the return of captured
Israeli soldiers. Id. at 723. The narrow question before the court was whether deten-
tion for reasons of state security, as set forth in the Administrative Detention Law,
included detention solely for the purpose of creating "bargaining chips," specifically
in negotiations with terrorist organizations that could supply information about the
missing Israeli soldier Ron Arad. Id.
44. Id.
45. Administrative Detention Law, 1979 S.H. 76, § 2.
46. Gross, Human Rights, supra note 17, at 726 (citing Anon v. Minister of De-
fence, 54(1) P.D. 721, 743 (Isr. 2000)).
47. Id. In Anon, Justice Barak recognized that "[t]he purpose behind every law
has both objective and subjective elements." Id. From the subjective point of view,
Chief Justice Barak clarified that there was nothing in Knesset's various bills that
showed the legislature intended a particular purpose to be considered in the interpre-
tation of the law or that enabled the detention of a person who did not directly imperil
the security of the State or the public. Id.
As for the objective purpose, it has to be weighed against basic values that
the law seeks to preserve. The Administrative Detention Law's objective
goals are (1) the preservation and protection of State security and (2) the
preservation of the basic values of dignity and freedom vested in every per-
son. Chief Justice Barak noted that in seeking to understand the scope of
these basic values and the proper balance between them in cases of adminis-
trative detention, a genuine, difficult and intense conflict is encountered.
Id.
48. Id. at 727.
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tainee were released, he would likely threaten the security of the
state and the ordinary course of life."49
d. Present Status of Administrative Detention in Israel
Those familiar with the progression of the administrative deten-
tion laws in Israel acknowledge that the Supreme Court of Israel is
more willing to intervene than it used to be when ruling on a secur-
ity decision.5 0 Today, the Court's attitude is that everything is sub-
ject to judicial review; Chief Justice Barak has encapsulated this
approach in the phrase "everything is justiciable. ' '5 ' To this day,
many people and organizations debate exactly what is permitted
under Israeli detention laws.52 Despite the rights newly afforded to
detainees in Israel and the Occupied Territories,53 many still feel
that the present application of the Administrative Detention Law
undermines basic human rights and blatantly opposes relevant in-
ternational laws such as the Fourth Geneva Convention.
5 4
B. Torture
1. Definition of Torture?
Before analyzing the effectiveness and appropriateness of em-
ploying torture as a response to terrorism, it is necessary to decide
what may be deemed "torture." There is, however, no agreed
upon definition of the word.55 Article 3 of the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights acknowledges a distinc-
tion between torture and inhumane or degrading treatment, but
fails to clarify the meaning of torture.56 The European Court of
Human Rights has held that the difference between these catego-
ries is determined by the amount of suffering one experiences and
has defined torture as the deliberate use of inhumane treatment
that causes severe and cruel pain and suffering. 57 Professor Daniel
Stetman, a well-respected scholar on torture, asserts that there is a
49. Id. at 752 (citing A.D.A. 1/82, Kawasma v. Minister of Defence, 36(1) P.D.
666, 668-69 (Isr. 1982)).
50. Id. at 758.
51. Id.
52. See id. at 759-60.
53. See discussion supra Part II.A.2.b.
54. See Administrative Detention: Despair, Uncertainty and Lack of Due Process,
supra note 40.
55. Gross, Terrorists and the Law, supra note 12, at 1169.
56. Id.
57. Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, 2 Eur. Ct. H.R. 25 (1978).
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difference between terrorist torture and interrogational torture.58
Other than the aforementioned, a widely accepted definition of
torture is found in Article 1 of the United Nations Convention
Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment.59
Article 1 states:
For the purposes of this Convention, the term "torture" means
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes
as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confes-
sion, punishing him for an act he or a third person has commit-
ted or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or
coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on dis-
crimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted
by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of
a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It
does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in,
or incidental to lawful sanctions.6"
2. International Law
Notwithstanding the differences found among the various defini-
tions of torture, international law explicitly prohibits torture and
any use of physical force or the intentional infliction of mental suf-
fering in interrogation-even if restricted to life-saving cases. 61 As
58. See Daniel Stetman, The Question of Absolute Morality Regarding the Prohibi-
tion on Torture, 4 LAW & Gov'T 161, 162 (1997) (defining terrorist torture as torture
aimed at deterring those members of the group to which the suspect is affiliated by
instilling fear in the group so that they shall cease their activities; defining interroga-
tional torture as the infliction of severe physical or mental pain during the course of
the interrogation, with the purpose of extracting certain information from the suspect,
and not exclusively for the purposes of deterrence or instilling fear.)
59. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, G.A. Res. 39/46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N.
Doc. A/39/51 (1984) [hereinafter U.N. Convention Against Torture] (entered into
force June 26, 1987) (ratified by Israel in 1991).
60. Id.
61. B'Tselem: Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Terri-
tories, Torture: International Law, at http://www.betselem.org/english/Torture/Inter-
nationalLaw.asp (last visited Dec. 2, 2001) [hereinafter B'Tselem: Torture: Interna-
tional Law]. Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which the UN
General Assembly adopted on 10 December 1948, states that, "No one shall be sub-
jected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
Article 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 classifies "torture or inhuman
treatment" and "willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health"
as "grave breaches" of the Convention, all of "which are the equivalent of war
crimes" under international law. Id. Further, Article 31 of the Fourth Geneva Con-
vention of 1949 directs that, "No physical or moral coercion shall be exercised against
270
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per international law, torture is treated like slavery, genocide, and
war crimes, and is deemed unjustifiable at all times and in all cir-
cumstances.62 The U.N. Convention Against Torture states that
"[n]o exceptional circumstances... may be invoked as a justifica-
tion for torture. ' 63 While the reasons for this prohibition are nu-
merous, two are commonly accepted as the most obvious: 1) the
physical and mental integrity of the person must be honored, as
democracy is based upon respect for such a security; and 2) evi-
dence obtained through the use of torture is inherently unreliable
as doubts as to the validity of confessions and information elicited
by force are immediately formed.'
3. History/Succession of Israeli Law
a. Aftermath of the Landau Commission
Until recently, Israel was the only democratic country in the
world whose judiciary had legally sanctioned the use of torture as a
legitimate means of extracting confessions and other information
from suspects during interrogation.6 5 The government of Israel
employs its General Security Service ("GSS") as the principal body
responsible for the fight against terrorism. 66 Sanctions gave the
GSS the exclusive right to implement special measures during such
interrogations.67
protected persons, in particular to obtain information from them or from third par-
ties." Id. Article 3 of the Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Being
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punish-
ment, unanimously adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1975, states: "No state
may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of war, inter-
nal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked as a justifi-
cation of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment." Id.
62. Id.
63. UN Convention Against Torture, supra note 59, art. 2.
64. Ardi Imseis, "Moderate" Torture On Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli
Supreme Court Judgment Concerning the Legality of General Security Service Interro-
gation Methods, 19 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 328, 331 (2001).
65. B'tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Territories, Legitimizing Torture: The Israeli High Court of Justice Rulings in the
Bilbeisi, Hamdam and Mubarak Cases, at http://www.btselem.org/Download/1997/
LegitimizingTortur%20 Eng.doc (last visited Jan. 2001).
66. Supreme Court of Israel: Judgment Concerning the Legality of the General
Security Service's Interrogation Methods, 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999) [hereinafter GSS Tor-
ture Case].
67. Commission of Inquiry into the Methods of Investigation of the General Se-
curity Service Regarding Hostile Terrorist Activities, Landau Commission Report
(1987) [hereinafter Landau Commission Report].
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Specifically, a 1987 governmental report (the "Landau Commis-
sion") recommended that the GSS exercise the use of "moderate
physical and psychological pressure" on Palestinians suspected of
"security" offenses. 68 The Landau Commission concluded that in
certain circumstances, the use of "a moderate measure of physical
pressure" in the course of interrogation is justified by the defense
of necessity.69 In response to the practices authorized by the Lan-
dau Commission, in 1997 and 1998, the U.N. Committee Against
Torture deliberated on Israel's use of "moderate pressure" and
unanimously ruled that the GSS interrogation methods constituted
torture.7 o
b. The Decision in the. GSS Torture Case
Finally, on September 6, 1999, the issue of torture was decided
by the Supreme Court of Israel. 71 The decision was made in re-
sponse to seven petitions to the Court made by human rights orga-
nizations on behalf of Palestinian interrogees.72 That same day, a
nine-judge panel of the Supreme Court unanimously outlawed
methods of physical force that were routinely used during interro-
gations by the GSS.73 The court held, in opposition to the Landau
Commission Report, 74 that the defense of necessity does not con-
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. B'Tselem: Torture: International Law, supra note 61.
71. GSS Torture Case, supra note 66.
72. Id. These organizations included the following: The Public Committee
Against Torture in Israel, The Association for Civil Rights in Israel and The Center
for Defence of the Individual.
73. Id. The methods specifically outlawed by the decision were 1) shaking, de-
fined as "the forceful shaking of the suspect's upper torso, back and forth, repeatedly,
in a manner which causes the neck and head to dangle and vacillate rapidly"; 2) wait-
ing in the "Shabach" position:
a suspect investigated under the 'Shabach' position has his hands tied behind
his back. He is seated on a small and low chair, whose seat is tilted forward,
towards the ground. One hand is tied behind the suspect, and placed inside
the gap between the chair's seat and back support. His second hand is tied
behind the chair, against its back support. The suspect's head is covered by
an opaque sack, falling down to his shoulders. Powerfully loud music is
played in the room;
3) the frog crouch, "this refers to consecutive, periodical crouches on the tips of one's
toes, each lasting for five minute intervals"; 4) excessive tightening of handcuffs; and
5) sleep deprivation. Id.
74. Landau Commission Report, supra note 67. The Landau Commission Report
did not hold that the "necessity" defence is the source of authority for employing
physical means by GSS investigators during the course of their interrogations. Id. All
that the Commission determined with respect to the defense of necessity was that if
an investigator finds himself in a situation of "necessity," constraining him to choose
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stitute a source of authority allowing GSS investigators to make use
of physical means during the course of interrogations.75 The panel
explicitly stated that such authority "must be rooted in an authori-
zation prescribed by law."76
4. Present standing of Torture Law in Israel
Despite this breakthrough decision, many criticize the judgment
of the High Court. Some feel that, notwithstanding the restrictions
on the GSS imposed by the ruling, much more must be done before
the use of torture in Israel and the Occupied Territories is finally
put to rest.77 Some feel that the panel's recommendation that the
Knesset enact legislation that will enable the GSS to engage in sim-
ilar activity effectively renders the decision meaningless in advanc-
ing the cause of the rule of law in Israel.78
the "lesser evil"-harming the suspect for the purpose of saving human lives-the
"necessity" defence shall be available to him. GSS Torture Case, supra note 66.
75. GSS Torture Case, supra note 66 (emphasis added). The court went into
lengthy discussion about the defense of necessity and its effect on interrogations. Id.
They made clear that even though the defense of necessity may be available, after the
fact, to absolve an investigator of criminal liability, it will not authorize an infringe-
ment of human rights. Id.
76. Id. The panel stated:
[i]f the State wishes to enable GSS investigators to utilize physical means in
interrogations, they must seek the enactment of legislation for this purpose.
This authorization would also free the investigator applying the physical
means from criminal liability. This release would flow not from the "neces-
sity" defence but from the "justification" defense which states: 'A person
shall not bear criminal liability for an act committed in one of the following
cases: (1) He was obliged or authorized by law to commit it.'
Id.
77. See Imseis, supra note 64, at 330.
78. Id. at 349. The following are other alleged deficiencies of the High Court's
opinion:
1) "its failure to review other harsher methods of torture that GSS interro-
gators have been implicated in using;" Id. 2) "its failure to scrutinize the
undoubtedly abusive interrogative activities of the IDF and the Israeli police
force;" Id. 3) "its refusal to examine the torture and ill-treatment that oc-
curs during the post-arrest/pre-interrogation period;" Id. and 4) "its overly
simplistic contextualization of the case before it as merely requiring a bal-
ance between respecting the liberty rights of "hostile terrorists" and protect-
ing the 'security' of the state." Id.
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C. Demolition of Houses
1. Israeli Law
Another measure frequently taken by Israel in response to acts
of terror is the demolition of homes of alleged terrorists.79 Israeli
law justifies such activities based on Regulation 119 of the Defense
(Emergency) Regulations of 1945.80 Regulation 119 empowers the
military commander to order the demolition of a house and to con-
fiscate the land on which it is built.81 In relevant part, Regulation
119(1) of the Defense Regulations provides:
A military commander may by order direct the forfeiture to the
Government of Palestine of any house, structure or land from in
which he has reason to suspect that any firearm has been ille-
gally discharged, or any bomb, grenade or explosive or incendi-
ary article illegally thrown detonated, exploded or otherwise
discharged or of any house, structure or land situated in any
area, town, village, quarter or street the inhabitants or some of
the inhabitants of which he is satisfied have committed, or at-
tempted to commit, or abetted the commission of, or been ac-
cessories after the fact to the commission of, any offence against
these Regulations involving violence or intimidation or any Mil-
itary Court offence, and when any house, structure or land is
forfeited as aforesaid, the Military commander may destroy the
house or the structure or anything in or on the house, the struc-
ture or the land.82
The terms of Regulation 119 clearly give the military commander
broad power to respond to terrorist acts that impair the security of
the population or threaten public order.83 One issue that arises
from Regulation 119 is whether it is just to allow an administrative
authority, vis-a-vis a judicial authority, to order a house demoli-
tion.84 Opponents of this deterrent method argue that by granting
a governmental authority power that, in a democratic regime, char-
acteristically belongs to the judiciary, it blatantly violates basic
79. B'tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied
Terrirories, The Legal Basis for Demolition and Sealing of Houses, at http://www.bet
selem.org/english/HouseDemolitions/Legal-Basis.asp (last visited Dec. 3, 2001)
thereinafter B'tselem: House Demolitions].
80. Defense (Emergency) Regulations 1945, Palestine Gazette (No. 1442), Reg.




83. See Gross, Democracy's Struggle, supra note 5, at 186.
84. Id. at 186-93.
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human rights by punishing a person without due process.85 On the
contrary, advocates of this approach assert that even a democratic
state, finding itself in a grave predicament, such as the state of war,
must equip its commanders with effective tools to provide an im-
mediate response to terrorist acts-including not only "sophisti-
cated weaponry", but also legal tools that can provide for the
immediate deterrence of potential terrorists.86
2. International Law
Various international instruments label the demolition of houses
in Israel as collective punishment. 87 Article 33 of the Fourth Ge-
neva Convention defines collective punishment as punishment of
an individual for an offense he or she has not personally commit-
ted.88 Article 33 unequivocally prohibits collective punishment:
"[n]o protected person may be punished for an offence he or she
has not personally committed. Collective penalties and likewise all
measures of intimidation or of terrorism are prohibited."'8 9
Moreover, the demolition of houses is explicitly forbidden by in-
ternational law.90
Article 53 of the Geneva Convention reads:
Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or personal
property belonging individually or collectively to private per-
sons, or to the State, or to other public authorities, or to social
or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military
operations.
9 1
The International Committee of the Red Cross defines the vague
term "military operation[s]" as "movements, maneuvers, and other
actions taken by the armed forces with a view to fighting."92
The Hague Convention of 1899 is another international instru-
ment that prohibits collective punishment. Article 50 of the Hague
Convention reads: "[n]o general penalty, pecuniary or otherwise,
shall be inflicted upon the population on account of the acts of
85. Id.
86. Id. at 187.
87. Amnesty Int. On-line, Israel: Occupied Territories: Palestinians Suffer Renewed
Collective Punishment, at http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/engmde151002002
(June 26, 2002) [hereinafter Amnesty: Collective Punishment].
88. Geneva Convention (IV), Aug. 12, 1949, Part III, art. 33.
89. Id.
90. Id. at part III, sec. 3, art. 53.
91. Id. (emphasis added).
92. B'tselem: House Demolitions, supra note 79.
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individuals for which they cannot be regarded as jointly and sever-
ally responsible."93
Many sources prohibit collective punishment, thus denying the
legality of Regulation 119.94 The primary criticisms of Regulation
119 can be summed up as follows:
1) Regulation 119 violates the prohibition on collective
punishment.
2) Regulation 119 violates the prohibition on violating the right
of property.
3) Regulation 119 violates the provision of the international law,
that provides private property cannot be seized.
4) Regulation 119 violates the right to due process.95
The High Court of Israel has held on more than one occasion
that international law is irrelevant with respect to 119.96 The Court
reasoned that Regulation 119 is part of domestic law, which takes
precedent over provisions in international treatises.97
Despite its seemingly indifferent attitude toward international
law, the High Court has responded to the petitions against, and
pervasive criticisms of, the Israeli government's practices by setting
forth certain requirements for an order of a house demolition.98
The court has implemented a proportionality test and a reasonable-
ness test.99 The proportionality test requires that the military com-
mander ordering the destruction of a house conform the exercise
of his power to the severity of the case or to the gravity of the
circumstances."° The reasonableness test examines the reasona-
bleness of the military commander's decision and asks whether a
reasonable military commander would have adopted a similar deci-
sion.10 1 Notwithstanding the High Court's efforts, most interna-
tional organizations are unsatisfied with the prevailing Israeli law
regarding house demolitions.10 2
93. THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907 123
(James Brown Scott ed., 1915) (citing art. 50 of the Hague Convention of 1899).
94. See supra notes 80-87 and accompanying text.
95. See Gross, Democracy's Struggle, supra note 5, at 193.
96. B'tselem: House Demolitions, supra note 79.
97. Id.
98. Gross, Democracy's Struggle, supra note 5, at 184 (citing H.C. 6026/94, Nazal
v. Commander, 48(5) P.D. 338, 342 (Isr. 1985)).
99. Id. at 185-86.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. See Amnesty: Collective Punishment, supra note 87.
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Il. THE UNITED STATES RESPONSES TO TERRORISM
A. Administrative Detention: The Patriot Act
Well before September 11, 2001, the United States government
targeted Osama Bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network through a
series of anti-terrorist programs dating back to the mid 1990's. 10 3
Within one week of the terrorist attacks on New York and Wash-
ington, D.C., Congress strengthened the. nation's anti-terrorist
sanctions and began passing laws to more effectively fight the war
on terror.10
4
The most noteworthy law enacted in response to September 11th
has been the Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Ap-
propriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act
of 2001 ("Patriot Act"). 10 5 The Patriot Act gives the government
broad power and discretion in acting to fight the war on terror. 10 6
103. Peter L. Fitzgerald, Managing "Smart Sanctions" Against Terrorism Wisely, 36
NEW ENG. L. REv. 957, 957-58 (2002). Specifically, the United States government
implemented the Terrorist Sanctions Regulations in 1996, which requires "U.S. per-
sons" to freeze the assets of those who threaten peace in the Middle East, and the
Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanctions Regulations in 1997, which criminializes
providing support or resources to certain foreign terrorist organizations. Id.
104. Senate Joint Resolution.23, the Military Force Authorization bill, enacted on
September 18, 2001, authorizes the President to use all necessary force against any
organization or State found to have been involved in planning or committing the ter-
rorist attacks on the United States. Joshua D. Zelman, Recent Developments in Inter-
national Law: Anti-Terrorism Legislation-Part One: An Overview, 11 J. TRANSNAT'L
L. & POL'Y 183, 185-86 (2001) [hereinafter Zelman, Part One]. Additionally, such
force can be utilized against any country that is found to have been a safe haven for
such terrorist organizations. Id. On November 19, 2001, President Bush signed S.
1447, the Aviation and Transportation Security Act, into law. Id. The ASA estab-
lishes the Transportation Security Administration, which is responsible for all domes-
tic transportation, including security screening at all airports. The Under Secretary is
given the authority to place Federal 'air marshals on every passenger flight and re-
quires that the Under Secretary place an air marshal on every long-distance flight that
is determined to present high security risks. Id. Furthermore, all of baggage checked
in any U.S. airport must be screened by all airlines and the screeners, who will be
subject to a background check along with all other airline workers, must all be U.S.
citizens. Id. Most significantly, however, the ASA not only directs the National Insti-
tute of Justice to determine the range of less-than-lethal weaponry available to flight
deck personnel, it allows pilots to carry firearms. Id. at 186. For purposes of this
paper we will not discuss the preceding provisions in detail.
105. Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Re-
quired to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act"), Pub. L. No.
107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
106. The Patriot Act makes available the use of military assistance in the enforce-
ment of civil law. Zelman, Part One, supra note 104, at 186. Amongst the broad
powers granted to the President of the United States, the Act also authorizes the
President to seize the property and funds of foreign nationals suspected of being in-
volved in plotting an attack against the United States. Id. Section 201 adds several
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This comment concentrates on sections 411 and 412 of the Act, the
sections that have drawn the most criticisms from civil libertarians.
1. Section 411: Definitions Relating to Terrorism
Section 411 of the Patriot Act expands the definition of "terror-
ist activity" as used in the Immigration and Nationality Act.107 Sec-
tion 411 also expands what is considered engaging in terrorist
activity and makes an alien who provides "material support" (i.e.,
food, shelter, transportation, funds etc.) to a terrorist removable
whether or not the alien knew the person was involved in such
activity.10 8
terrorism-related offenses to the list of offenses for which expanded interception of
wire, oral and electronic communication can be obtained pursuant to the Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. Id. Additionally, the Act allows the
issuance of a roving wiretap, trap and trace devices, and pen registers when seeking to
collect information during a foreign intelligence investigation. Id. Furthermore, the
[Patriot] Act, in effect, trumps Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), regarding the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings, when matters of national security arise. Id. at 186-
87. "The Act prohibits the maintenance of correspondent accounts for foreign banks
that have no physical presence in any country. The Act also requires that banks and
financial institutions report all suspicious activity and the disclosure of banks records
of those under investigation for financial crimes related to terrorism." Id. at 187. The
Act provides for a significant increase in funding for the INS, Border Patrol, and
Customs Service to triple the number of personnel in each state located on the Cana-
dian border. Id. "Section 403 authorizes background checks, through the National
Criminal Information Files database, of all persons who meet certain identifying char-
acteristics who apply for Visas." Id. The Attorney General and the Secretary of State
are also authorized to pay rewards to persons who provide information, leading to the
arrest and conviction of terrorists. Id. at 188.
107. See Patriot Act § 1182.
Section 1182(a)(3)(b)(iii) now makes it a terrorist act to do any act that is
unlawful: under the laws of the place where it is committed (or which, if it
had been committed in the United States, would be unlawful under the laws
of the United States or any State) and which involves any of the following:
(I) The hijacking . .. of any conveyance.... (II) The seizing or detaining,
and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain, another individual in
order to compel a third person ... to do or abstain from doing any act....
(V) The use of any- (b) explosive, firearm, or other weapon or dangerous
device ... with intent to endanger ... the safety of one or more individuals
or to cause substantial damage to property. (VI) A threat, attempt, or con-
spiracy to do any of the foregoing.
Id. § 1182 (a)(3)(b)(iii); Joshua Zelman, Recent Developments in International Law:
Anti-Terrorism Legislation-Part Two: The Impact and Consequences, 11 J. TRANS-
NAT'L L. & POL'Y 421, 423 (2002) [hereinafter Zelman, Part Two].
108. Zelman, Part Two, supra note 107, at 423. Section 1182(a)(3)(B)(iv)(VI)
states:
[T]o commit an act that the actor knows, or reasonably should know, affords
material support, including a safe house, transportation, communications,
funds, transfer of funds or other material financial benefit.. . to any individ-
2003] COMPARISON OF ISRAELI & AMERICAN LAW 279
2. Section 412: Mandatory Detention of Suspected Terrorists;
Habeas Corpus; Judicial Review
This section allows the indefinite detention of aliens when the
Attorney General "has reasonable grounds to believe that the alien
is a terrorist." 1 9 Section 412 further states that an alien must be
released seven days after the commencement of detention if he is
not placed in removal proceedings110 or charged with a criminal
offense.'11 Section 1226(a)(6) of this section, entitled "Limitation
on Indefinite Detention,1112 implies that the government limits the
length of time that an alien may be detained.1 1 3 A reading of the
statute, however, reveals that detention may be continued indefi-
nitely, through a series of additional six-month periods, if the attor-
ney general continues to assert that the alien poses a threat to
national security or to the safety of others." 4
Similar to the criticisms of Israeli detention laws, many have crit-
icized the Patriot Act's legalization of a deprivation of basic human
rights such as due process." 5 The United States has sustained
one's right to due process of law since its establishment. 1 6 The
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment states that "no person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law.' 1 17 The Due Process Clause applies to all "persons,"
not just U.S. citizens." 8 The Supreme Court has held that illegal
aliens are afforded the protections of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments, which, among other things, grant the right of due
process." 9 Many argue the terms of 412 permitting an alien be de-
tained for seven days without any charge 120 do not provide a de-
ual who the actor knows, or reasonably should know, has committed or
plans to commit a terrorist activity [as defined above].
109. See Patriot Act § 1226(a)(3).
110. A removal proceeding is a proceeding used to determine whether an alien will
be deported or permitted to remain in the country.
111. Patriot Act § 1226(a)(3).
112. Id. § 1226(a)(6).
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See Zelman, Part Two, supra note 107, at 426-35.
116. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
117. Id.
118. Zelman, Part Two, supra note 107, at 426 (stating that it is recognized that all
citizens are "persons," but not all "persons" are citizens).
119. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 210 (1982); see also Wong Wing v. U.S., 163 U.S.
228 (1896).
120. The Patriot Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001).
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tainee with his most basic right of Procedural Due Process.12 1
Furthermore, the provisions governing the detention of an alien
terrorist do not mention a trial or hearing requirement to deter-
mine, beyond a reasonable doubt, whether the alien committed the
acts of which she is accused.2 2
The Patriot Act has been one of the prime tools used by the U.S.
government in responding to terrorism since September 11th. 23 It
was drawn up and enacted under severe pressure to respond to the
September 11th attack and has since been the subject of much criti-
cism.124 Many disapprove of the broad authority it grants certain
U.S. officials and question whether its legislation contradicts the
general principles on which a democratic society is based. 25
B. Freezing of Assets
1. Generally
Economic sanctions are frequently the government's first and
principal tool to deal with international terrorism. 126 In the United
States, the Treasury Department's Office of Foreign Assets Control
("OFAC") administers the various economic sanction programs.2 7
"The Terrorist Sanctions Regulations (TSR), promulgated in
1996, require 'U.S. persons' (i.e., U.S. citizens or residents wher-
ever located, and U.S. business entities, including their overseas
branches) to block or 'freeze' the assets of those who threaten the
Middle East peace process. "128 These controls were expanded to
cover all global terrorism when, on September 23, 2001, President
Bush invoked his authority under the International Emergency Ec-
121. Whitney D. Frazier, The Constitutionality of Detainment in the Wake of Sep-
tember 11th, 90 Ky. L.J. 1089, 1115 (2001-02); Dean Schabner, Patriot Revolution?
Cities From Cambridge to Berkeley Reject Anti-Terror Measures, ABC NEWS.COM,
July 1, 2002, at http://www.commondreams.org/headlines02/0701-08.htm (last visited
Dec. 2, 2002).
122. See Patriot Act § 1182.
123. See Alison A. Bradley, Extremism in the Defense of Liberty?: The Foreign In-
telligence Surveillance Act and the Significance of the USA Patriot Act, 77 TUL. L. REV.
465, 466-67 (2002); David Rocah, America at War-the Legal Issues, 35 MD. BAR J. 34
(2002); Donna Shearer, What Price Safety?, 35 MD. BAR J. 22 (2002).
124. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises
Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1033 (2003) (stating that the Congress
moved to pass the Patriot Act despite criticisms that it was "interfering unnecessarily
and excessively with individual rights and liberties.")
125. Id.
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onomic Powers Act'29 to issue Executive Order 13224 ("Order
132241).130 Generally, this order provides a means to disrupt the
financial support network for terrorist organizations, blocking or
freezing their assets as well as those of their front organizations,
agents, and associates, and other entities and individuals that pro-
vide. services or assistance to them.1 3 Prior executive orders and
legislation have been directed at combating terrorism, 132 but Order
13224 provides for sanctions against terrorists and their supporters
that are broader in scope than previous sanctions.
33
Specifically, Order 13224:
1) Authorizes the blocking of the property and interests in prop-
erty, including bank deposits, of those designated in the An-
nex'33 by the President, as well as those subsequently designated
by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of the Treasury, as
authorized in the Order.
2) Targets foreign entities and individuals determined to have
committed, or to pose a significant risk of committing, acts of
terrorism that "threaten the security of U.S. nationals or the na-
tional'security, foreign policy, or economy of the United States,"
as determined by the Secretary of State, in consultation with the
Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
3) Targets other entities or individuals that are acting for or on
behalf of, or are owned or controlled by, persons designated in
or pursuant to the Order; that assist in or provide support or
financial or other services to those entities and individuals desig-
nated in or under the Order; or are associated with certain cate-
gories of entities and individuals designated in or under the
Order, as determined by the Secretary of the Treasury, in con-
129. 50 U.S.C. §1701-04 (2001). The International Emergency Economic Powers
Act grants the President broad authority in responding to an unusual or extraordinary
threat with respect to which a national emergency has been declared. Id.
130. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 66 Fed. Reg. 49,079 (Sept. 23, 2001).
131. Id.
132. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 597 (2001). The Foreign Terrorist Organizations Sanc-
tions Regulations, published in 1997, criminalized providing support or resources to
foreign terrorist organizations designated by the Secretary of State. Id. OFAC's Ter-
rorism List Governments Sanctions Regulations makes it a crime to conduct unli-
censed financial dealings with the governments which have been designated by the
Secretary of State as supporters of terrorism. Himamauli Das, The United States
Sanctions Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001: A Synopsis of Remarks at the
NESL Rogue Regimes Conference, 36 NEw ENG. L. REV. 943, 945 (2002).
133. Id. at 944. Executive Order 13099 added Osama Bin Laden, Al-Queda, and
two other organizations to the list of twelve terrorist organizations designated by
President Clinton in the Annex to Executive Order 12947. Id. at n.6.
134. The "Annex" refers to a list assembled by the Government of 27 organizations
and individuals labeled as suspected terrorists or suspected supporters of terrorism.
Id. at n. 5.
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sultation with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General.
(This may include non-governmental or charitable organiza-
tions, as well as financial institutions in third countries that pro-
vide financial or other services to or for persons designated in or
pursuant to the Order.) 135
While the powers given under Order 13224 are clearly broad in
scope, President Bush, in his message to Congress regarding the
Order, "committed to exercising [these powers] responsibly, with
due regard for the culpability of the persons and entities poten-




The dominant criticisms of the OFAC's regulations allege that
there are too many legal and practical obstacles in challenging
OFAC's rulings or actions. 37 On a practical level, while OFAC's
regulations permit parties to administratively request reconsidera-
tion of their assets being frozen, there is no right under the regula-
tions to review the factual basis or reasons for the initial blocking
decision.138 It is argued that such a blocking or freezing of assets
amounts to a "taking" of property without Due Process under the
Fifth Amendment, and is therefore unconstitutional. 139 Ruling on
this issue, the Supreme Court noted that blocking or freezing or-
ders only effect a temporary deprivation of property, because when
lifted, the property is released into the custody of the owner.1 40
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that pre-deprivation hear-
ings are not required.' 41 In IPT v. United States Department of
Treasury,42 the Supreme Court was quoted:
135. See id. at 946.
136. President Declares National Emergency, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news /
releases/2001/09/ 20010924.html (last visited Dec. 2, 2002).
137. See generally Peter L. Fitzgerald, "If Property Rights Were Treated Like
Human Rights, They Could Never Get Away With This": Blacklisting and Due Process
in U.S. Economic Sanctions Programs, 51 HASTINGS L.J. 73, 88-110 (1999) (discussing
OFAC's actions and the obstacles involved in challenging these actions).
138. Fitzgerald, supra note 103, at 976.
139. Id.; see also Chang v. United States, 859 F.2d 893, 894 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
140. Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-334 (1976).
141. Id.
142. No. 92 Civ. 5542, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15807, at *13-14 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4,
1994). In this case, Plaintiff IPT Company, Inc, engaged in importing and exporting
goods internationally, challenged the blocking of its assets implemented by former
President Bush's Executive Orders, 12,808 and 12,810. Similarly, President Bush is-
sued these two orders under the authority of the International Economic Emergency
Powers Act.
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The power [to issue Executive Orders] in peace and war must be
given generous scope to accomplish its purpose. Through the
Trading with the Enemy Act, in its various forms, the nation
sought to deprive enemies, actual or potential of the opportu-
nity to secure advantages to themselves or to perpetrate wrongs
against the Unites States or its citizens through the use of assets
that happened to be in this country. To do so has necessitated
some inconvenience to our citizens and others who, as here, are
not involved in any actions adverse to the nation's interest. That
fact, however, cannot lead us to narrow the broad coverage of
the Executive Order. 143
Critics also argue that one would likely be intimidated to request
a reconsideration based on the OFAC's broad authority.14 4 Critics
assert that in order to challenge a particular decision, the stakes
would have to be sufficiently large to offset the fear of upsetting
future dealings with an agency vested with a tremendous amount of
authority and subject to relatively little oversight. 145 Consequently,
it often takes something like being placed on the blacklist (the list
of parties whose assets are blocked) itself,146 which threatens the
ongoing viability of a business, before a party is inclined to initiate
action against OFAC. 147
Notwithstanding the criticisms 14s of and the challenges to the
OFAC's ability to freeze or block the assets of organizations and
businesses suspected of affiliation with terrorism, the Supreme
Court consistently upholds the constitutionality of Order 13224.
C. Torture
The United States government maintains that it conforms to the
widely accepted international laws and provisions 49 relating to tor-
ture.' 50 Furthermore, torture remains an unexplored issue before
the United States courts and Congress and, hence, is not a subject
of much contention.
143. Id. (citing Propper v. Clark, 337 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1949)).
144. Fitzgerald, supra note 103, at 976.
145. Id.
146. This is different than being subject to restrictions on dealings with blacklisted
parties.
147. Fitzgerald, supra note 103, at 976.
148. See supra notes 114-24 and accompanying text.
149. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
150. The Geneva Convention (IV), Aug. 12, 1949, Part III, sec. 1 (including the
United States as a High Contracting Party).
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CONCLUSION
Terrorism is no longer an issue that the people of the United
States can trivialize. On September 11, 2001, America's eyes were
forced open, and a people were made aware of the gravity of a
problem that until then was seemingly a distant one. Conversely,
Israel has been dealing with terrorism since the day of its founding
in 1948. Almost every day, the death toll rises in Israel as a result
of mass murder committed by Palestinian suicide bombers. In re-
sponse, Israeli law grants its governmental agencies exceptionally
broad powers in efforts to prevent terrorism.
This comment discussed a number of legal tools employed by
Israel and the United States at a time when terrorism poses an im-
minent threat to national security. During such times, a demo-
cratic government must protect its nation while preserving human
rights and civil liberties, including those of the terrorists; for free-
dom is the very notion on which a democracy is based. Clearly, the
task of maintaining this balance is a precarious one. Many United
States citizens are concerned that to the extent that we emulate
Israeli rationales and procedures in fighting the war on terror, we
risk depriving individuals of basic civil liberties. People fear that if
the U.S. government continues to use national security as a justifi-
cation, like Israel, torture may one day become an issue before our
courts as well.
It is essential that people question a government's ability to re-
strict the rights of others. Without this pressure a government
could easily abuse its powers and run amok. Considering the via-
bility of chemical warfare, however, we cannot underestimate the
nature of the threat before us. Terrorists today are not only willing
to die for their cause, but they incorporate that willingness into the
execution of their plans.
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